CLA Event
Antitrust in Digital Markets
An event dedicated to antitrust in digital markets, exploring the key challenges that the evolution of digital platforms and the digital economy pose to competition law. Through a discussion with professionals from some of the world’s leading international law firms, we will examine the role of antitrust in the digital landscape and explore the most pressing issues currently shaping this field.
Event Details
2026-10-06
Event Report
On Tuesday, October 6 2025, the Corporate Law Academy held an event focusing on antitrust in digital markets at Bocconi University. The event had three expert guest speakers on the matter: Natalia Latronico, Associate at Cleary Gottlieb, Alessandro Di Giò, Counsel at Freshfields, and Giorgio Valoti, Managing Associate at Linklaters. Together, the three lawyers explored the key challenges that the evolution of digital platforms and the digital economy pose to competition law through their respective legal perspectives. The event was moderated by professor Oreste Pollicino. What is Antitrust in Digital Markets? Antitrust in digital markets means applying competition laws and economic regulations to prevent large technology platforms from abusing monopoly power, stifling innovation, and engaging in unfair business practices. Natalia Latroncino on the abuse of dominance in the Digital Markets Lawyer Latroncino focused on the thin line between abuse of dominance, prohibited by Article 102 TFEU, and competition on the merits, a legitimate conduct in favour of competition. Article 102 TFEU explains that "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States". Such abuse may consist in: a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, rather than dominance itself. A dominant company has a special responsibility to uphold a competitive but legitimate conduct on the market. Examples such as unfair prices, limits on technical development and unequal terms for trading risk harming and distorting competition and harm consumers if not regulated appropriately. She pointed to European Commission Guidelines on the effect of trade, market definition and exclusionary conduct under Article 102, along with CJEU case law, as sources for interpreting these rules. She then looked at when a platform's refusal to give another company access might be considered abusive. The Bronner test is a mechanism to check this; The Bronner test is a a set of requirements which are used to determine whether competition authorities can impose a duty to deal on a dominant company. The refusal most likely eliminates competition in the relevant market and there should be no valid reason for it. Lawyer Latroncino used two Google cases to show that these strict requirements do not fit every type of behaviour. The Google Shopping case revolved around the dispute of whether Google's decisions were abusive for other competitors. Google gave its comparison-shopping service higher and better placement in search results. In this case, Google did not refuse to provide an indispensable facility, however, it would have introduced a very challenging obstacle for other competitors to overcome, making the competition a lot harder. In the Google Android Auto case, Google decided not to make Enel's electric-vehicle charging app compatible with Android Auto, a platform that allows other apps to appear on a car's screen. For this particular case, the Court of Justice decided that such a refusal can be deemed as an abuse of dominance, even if it doesn't appear to be necessary. This decision would have had a different outcome in the case in which security issues or technical limitations would have supported such a refusal. Our first guest speaker concluded her part of the event by addressing how the Digital Market Act is designed to prevent the abuse of dominance in digital markets by comprehensively regulating the gatekeeper power of the largest digital companies to make the digital markets fairer and more contestable. Alessandro Di Giò on Merger control The second speaker addressed how merger control applies to digital markets. In this aspect, merger control regulates corporate acquisitions by large tech platforms to prevent monopolies and market tipping. Unlike rules on abuse of dominance, which assess conduct that is already taking place, merger control is oriented towards the future: authorities must predict whether a proposed transaction will harm effective competition. That task is especially difficult in digital markets, where innovation, data, network effects and ecosystems can quickly change competitive conditions. He noted that these issues are part of the debate surrounding the European Commission's draft merger guidelines. Lawyer Di Giò discussed which transactions authorities can review. Some acquisitions of small companies might fall below the usual notification thresholds for which they do not have mandatory merger review. However, these same small companies that produce little revenue today could potentially be valuable and strong competitors in the future. In order to ensure that their deals are monitored and legitimate, there are several ways that the company can call the authority's attention. If the transaction meets a relevant threshold, the companies must file it with the competent authority. This allows for transparency with the authorities, providing them with the information to be able to assess its legitimacy. The speaker mentioned call-in powers, which are exercised by the competent authorities in the case in which they see a concrete risk of competition if the deal does not require filing. In this way, the authorities can monitor the deal's conformity with the law. An example of the procedural question is illustrated by Nvidia-Run. In this case, the transaction did not meet the EU turnover thresholds, but Italy was able to review it and refer it to the European Commission using the call-in powers as the transaction raised suspicion for a risk. An ulterior mechanism is gatekeeper reporting, regulated under the Digital Markets Act, where the Commission must be notified about intended acquisitions and deals. This notification does not automatically imply that the deal will undergo formal merger review. Diversely, referrals are a way of assigning the review to the European Commission to review it instead of a national authority. This transfer of reviewing presupposes that the requirements to examine a deal, such as the thresholds, are met. Turning to the substance of a review, he distinguished between conglomerate, horizontal and vertical effects. A conglomerate merger may strengthen a digital ecosystem even when the companies are neither direct competitors nor linked through a supply chain. The case of Booking-eTraveli shows this principle. Due to the fact that Booking was already strong in online hotel reservations, acquiring eTraveli, a flight-booking provider, was seen as an acquisition which could have harmed the competition making it much harder for rival services to compete. Although the acquisition by Booking could have brought more travellers to their platform, the Commission weighed the risks with the benefits and ultimately chose to prohibit the acquisition. Horizontal mergers can reduce incentives to innovate, as illustrated by the proposed Adobe–Figma transaction. The Commission was concerned that the proposed acquisition by Adobe would entirely destroy the competition between the two companies as Figma would discontinue its innovation in terms of its tools and other Adobe products. Adobe and Figma ultimately abandoned the transaction. Vertical concerns include restrictions on access to data or distribution, which he discussed through Amazon–iRobot. In Amazon-iRobot, the Commission feared that Amazon could favour iRobot, directly resulting in other competitor's products to be harder to access or less visible on the platform. He concluded that assessing these transactions requires authorities to consider dynamic competition, future innovation and claimed efficiencies despite the uncertainty of predicting how markets will develop. Giorgio Valoti on Collusion in digital markets The final speaker, Giorgio Valoti, brought up the question of whether "traditional" competition enforcement appropriately addresses recent developments and new challenges emerging in the digital markets. He argues that national courts are required to be up-to-date on how the platforms and algorithms work in order to apply rules and restrictions appropriately. He used collusion to show why applying traditional rules now requires a closer understanding of these digital platforms. Collusion in digital markets, often called algorithmic collusion, occurs when competing businesses use pricing software, artificial intelligence, or data-sharing tools to coordinate prices and limit open competition. For example, one of the emerging problems is how platforms and algorithms can enable competitors to exchange commercially sensitive information without a formal agreement. This is a way to digitally bypass some traditional regulations. He cited the 2021 Italian investigation into motor insurance comparison websites to illustrate this problem. The authority suspected that reports shared through the websites allowed insurers to learn about competitors' prices and commercial strategies, considered to be commercially sensitive information. Valoti also discussed the Italian authority's inquiry into airline pricing on routes to and from Sicily and Sardinia. That inquiry looked into how airlines use dynamic pricing algorithms and raised questions about the transparency and comparability of fares. For this case, the use of an algorithm alone did not establish collusion. He concluded that companies need antitrust compliance programmes suited to the technology they use to avoid infringement and collusion. In particular, they should understand the difference between observing a market or using pricing tools and the exchange of sensitive information or coordination with competitors. Concluding reflections The event ended with a question raised from Professor Pollicino about the role AI is playing in their experience as legal practitioners. The speakers noted that AI tools are increasingly relevant to both competition investigations and legal practice. In terms of lawyer's work, AI can improve efficiency, but lawyers' responsibility is crucial when reviewing their outputs. A lawyer's role in producing the final outcome is closely linked to transparency to clients. In their experience, they emphasised particularly how junior lawyers entering the legal profession in an increasingly digital age should recognise that while AI can certainly improve efficiency, it is nothing without their independent judgment and careful verification.