Introduction

 
 
 

In recent years, European competition law has generated a vivid political and economic confrontation with regard to the global competitiveness of European companies.

 

The increased presence of large American and Chinese groups in world markets has prompted various governments and economic actors to argue that the current European merger control system is too rigid and can limit the competitiveness of European companies globally.

 

In this context, the comparison was born on the so-called European champions, that is, large European industrial groups that can achieve adequate size to compete in the strategic sectors of the global economy.

 

The issue became a fundamental one, especially after the European Commission blocked the merger between Siemens AG and Alstom in 2019, an event that rekindled the debate on the link between competition protection and European industrial policy.

 

The recent revision of the guidelines on European mergers shows that the European Union is seeking to strike a new balance between two potentially conflicting needs: on the one hand, the protection of competition and consumers in the internal market, on the other hand, the need to enhance the global competitiveness of European companies in an economic context increasingly marked by geopolitical and technological competition.

 
 
 

The European Merger Control System

 
 

Merger control is one of the key instruments with which the European Union protects competition in the internal market. With the so-called merger control, the European Commission must analyse mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures between companies, ensuring that these transactions do not generate anticompetitive effects incompatible with the smooth functioning of the European market.

 
 
 

The European merger law is mainly contained in EU Regulation No.

 
 
 

The system is based on the concept that certain concentrations, although they may generate economic and industrial benefits, may also reduce competitive pressure in the affected markets, with adverse effects for consumers and competitors.

 

In the merger analysis, the Commission uses the SIEC test, which was introduced by the 2004 Regulation, which is the basis for the prohibition of a concentration if it significantly limits effective competition in the internal market or in a significant part of it.

 

The Commission's assessment considers several factors, such as the market share of the companies concerned, the degree of concentration of the sector, the barriers to entry for new entrants, the economic power of companies and the potential impacts on prices, innovation and quality of services. With this system, the European Union intends to prevent the formation or strengthening of dominant positions that could harm competition in the European market.

 

Traditionally, European antitrust legislation has followed a very strict method in monitoring mergers, giving priority to protecting competition and the internal market over other industrial or geopolitical issues. The main aim of the system is to ensure open and competitive markets, preventing mergers that can lead to price increases, decrease in innovation, reduction in the quality of services or exclusion of competitors from the market. In this perspective, competition policy in Europe has traditionally been seen as a means of protecting consumers and promoting the integration of the European internal market.

 
 
 

Siemens-Alstom case and the European Champions' debate

 
 
 

The debate on the need to reform the European merger control system reached its most significant moment with the Siemens AG case (Alastom). In 2017, the two companies declared a merger plan to form one of the main rail groups at global level, active in the sectors of high-speed trains and railway signalling systems.

 

The operation had the political support mainly of France and Germany, which saw as a strategic strategy to strengthen European industrial competitiveness compared to the large non-European groups.

 

In February 2019, the European Commission decided to stop the merger, arguing that the operation would significantly decrease competition in the European markets for rail signalling systems and high-speed trains. The Commission stated that the merger would generate a dominant position in sectors of great importance for European infrastructure, with potential adverse effects on prices, innovation and options available for European rail operators. In addition, the solutions presented by companies were considered inadequate to solve the competitive problems reported by the Commission.

 

The choice triggered strong political reactions, particularly from the French and German administrations, which reproached the European institutions for enforcing antitrust regulations which were no longer appropriate for the new world economic scenario. On the basis of this approach, the Commission would have taken too narrow a view of the European internal market, not taking sufficient account of the growing international competition exerted by large foreign companies, in particular the Chinese railway giant CRRC Corporation.

 

The concept of European Champions has been strengthened from the very point of view of Siemens-Alstom, an expression used to indicate large European industrial groups capable of reaching sufficient size to compete with the main US and Chinese companies in global markets. According to the supporters of this approach, the excessive rigidity of European merger rules would risk preventing European companies from reaching the necessary scale to invest in innovation, advanced technologies and strategic infrastructure.

 

Conversely, critics of this vision argue that a relaxation of antitrust control could undermine the protection of competition in the European market, favouring the creation of oligopolies and reducing the benefits for consumers and businesses. The Siemens-Alstom case has therefore highlighted an increasingly central tension in European competition law: that between the protection of the internal market and the need to strengthen the geopolitical and industrial competitiveness of the European Union.

 
 
 

The Revision of the MERGER GUIDES of 2026

 
 
 

The growing criticism of the European merger control system prompted the European Commission to start a review of the Merger Guidelines in 2026, the first organic reform of the sector in over twenty years. The Commission's decision expresses the awareness that the international economic landscape has changed considerably compared to the period when the 2004 and 2008 directives were created.

 

Currently markets are characterised by strong digitisation, increased importance of strategic technologies, geopolitical competition between the US, China and Europe, and increasing emphasis on economic security, industrial resilience and sustainability.

 

The revision therefore stems from the need to adapt European competition law to a much more dynamic and complicated economic environment. In particular, several European governments and important industrial players have said that the Commission's traditional approach would be too focused on the immediate effects of mergers on the internal market, neglecting the long-term benefits that some mergers could generate in terms of innovation, investment and international competitiveness.

 

The recent guidelines suggested by the Commission show a significant change of vision. While continuing to focus on protecting competition, the reform pays more attention to the dynamic effects of merger operations, recognising that some mergers could enhance the ability of European companies to invest in research, develop innovative technologies and compete in international markets. In this context, concepts such as scale, industrial resilience, supply chain security and Europe's strategic competitiveness are key.

 

One of the most innovative elements of the review also concerns the increased emphasis on innovation and sustainability.

 

Recent indications do indeed appear to allow a favourable assessment of concentrations that support the energy transition, speed up technological investments or strengthen sectors considered crucial for European economic autonomy.

 

At the same time, the Commission concentrates more resources on digital and technological markets, addressing issues such as killer acquisitions, digital ecosystems and dynamic competition, which the traditional antitrust model struggled to handle completely.

 

Despite these openings, the Commission has nevertheless stressed that the reform does not mean that the essential principles of European competition law are removed, and consumer protection and the safeguarding of competitive markets remain the main aims of the control of European mergers, and that the revision of the guidelines seeks to balance two possible conflicting requirements: on the one hand to prevent concentrations harmful to competition, and on the other hand to allow European companies to obtain suitable dimensions to compete in an increasingly centralised and geopolitically competitive global economy.

 
 
 

European Antitrust and Global Competitiveness: a New Balance?

 
 
 

The revision of the guidelines on European mergers shows that competition law in the EU is experiencing a period of significant metamorphosis. For a long time, the European antitrust system has been based mainly on the protection of competition in the common market, placing particular emphasis on the effects of mergers on prices, on the quality of services and on the welfare of consumers. Currently, the growing global geopolitical and economic competition seems to direct the European Union towards a broader vision of merger control.

 

The presence of large US and Chinese technological and industrial conglomerates has consolidated the idea that European competitiveness cannot be based solely on safeguarding internal competition. In key sectors such as energy, defence, semiconductors, digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence, the possibility of European companies to achieve adequate dimensions is increasingly seen as a fundamental factor in ensuring the strategic autonomy and economic security of the European Union.

 

In this context, the 2026 update of the merger guidelines shows an increasing approach between antitrust legislation and industrial strategy. The main focus on aspects such as innovation, resilience, investment and global competitiveness highlights the Commission's determination to change the control of mergers for an economy with much more intricate dynamics than in the past. Mergers are no longer seen as only potential risks to competition, but also as tools that could be useful to enhance the competitiveness of European industry.

 

However, this same development poses important legal and economic questions: excessive availability to create European champions could indeed reduce competitive pressure in the European market, facilitating the emergence of oligopolies or positions of force that could harm competing consumers and companies. In addition, the inclusion of criteria related to geopolitical competitiveness or industrial policy could expose the antitrust right to greater political influence, progressively altering its original function.

 

The central question therefore becomes aware of the extent to which competition law can become an industrial policy instrument without compromising the fundamental principles of the European internal market. The challenge for the European Union will be to strike a balance between protecting competition and global competitiveness, avoiding the need to strengthen European industry as a result of weakening precisely those competitive mechanisms which historically constituted one of the fundamental pillars of the European economic project.

 
 
 

Conclusion

 
 
 

The change in European merger laws is one of the most important changes in competition law in the European Union in recent years. The Siemens AG case debate has highlighted how the current antitrust system is at the centre of increasing tension between the protection of internal competition and the need to enhance the international competitiveness of European companies.

 

The revision of the 2026 merger guidelines highlights the European Commission's determination to update the merger control to the new economic and geopolitical dynamics, placing greater emphasis on innovation, investment, industrial resilience and European strategic autonomy. However, the danger of damaging the competitive balance of the internal market continues to be central in the discussion.

 

The future challenge of the European Union will therefore be to create a merger monitoring system that will harmonise global competitiveness and competition protection, preventing industrial policy from being able to dominate completely the fundamental principles of European antitrust law.

 
 
 

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